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Pension System Solvency – From Linguistics to 
Economicsa
Laurence J. Kotlikoffb
I’m honored to address the 2015 annual meeting of the Swiss Economic Society. 
The topic I was asked to examine – the Solvency of Pension Systems – is a chal-
lenging one. I’m going to begin my remarks by questioning whether I or anyone 
else can say anything economically coherent about the solvency of pension sys-
tems by themselves, i.e., as distinct parts of overall fiscal systems. My answer 
will be a firm NO. I will then turn to the real issue, which is overall fiscal sol-
vency, how to measure it, and the potential impact on overall fiscal solvency of 
recently observed pension reforms, which often have been reforms in name only.
Let me illustrate my concerns about measuring pension solvency taking the 
United States’ Social Security system as an example. If you look at table II.B1 
in the latest Social Security Trustees Report (Social Security Administra-
tion, 2014; the tables discussed here are printed in the Appendix to this essay), 
released in July of 2014, you’ll learn that the system is in surplus. In fact, it has a 
trust fund of $2.8 trillion. That’s a big number. If any of us had $2.8 trillion in 
the bank, we’d feel pretty rich and scoff at anyone who told us we were insolvent.
Moreover, if you consider the system’s trust fund over the next 8 years, as does 
table IV.A3 in the Report, things still seem very reassuring with the trust fund 
equaling $2.7 trillion in 2023.
But, as table IV.B1 tells us, after 2023 the system’s cash flows head south with 
each year’s gap between taxes and spending rising. By 2090, i.e., 75 years from 
now, the system’s expenditures exceed its taxes each year by 5 percent of the pro-
jected annual tax base.
Over this 75-year period the system has a fiscal gap – the present value of pro-
jected outflow net of its tax inflow and its current $2.8 trillion surplus of $10.6 
trillion. It’s rather hard to find this $10.6 trillion figure for a simple reason. It’s 
hidden deep in the Appendix of the Trustees Report in table VI.F1.
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Stated differently, this hidden table says the system is $10.6 trillion in debt 
over the next 75 years. And, very importantly, this is a present value. So while 
the trust fund is now $2.8 trillion, the system’s 75-year unfunded liability, which 
is net of the $2.8 trillion trust fund, is $10.6 trillion.
Clearly, this is getting confusing. First I tell you the system is swimming in 
money. Next I tell you it’s still swimming in money almost a decade from now. 
And then I tell you it’s in the red, right at this very moment, to the tune of $11 
trillion. Since U.S. GDP is now $18 trillion, $11 trillion represents over half a 
year’s total output. Imagine everyone in America working for a half year and con-
suming nothing, but instead handing all of the output produced over this period 
to the government to meet its future Social Security obligations.
But the confusion gets worse. If you look at table VI.F1, you’ll see two fiscal 
gaps – one calculated over the next 75 years and one calculated over the infinite 
horizon. The infinite horizon fiscal gap is $25 trillion! This is also a present value 
that is net of the current trust fund. It far exceeds current GDP. Furthermore, if 
you read the tables footnotes, you’ll learn that $25 trillion represents 33 percent 
of the present value of all projected future taxes from now through the end of 
time. Stated differently, the system, according to the infinite horizon projection, 
is 33 percent underfinanced!
Is $25 trillion the worst representation of the system’s current finances? Sorry, 
it’s not. A tax dollar is a tax dollar and there is no reason that Social Security’s 
payroll taxes need to viewed as paying for Social Security benefits. They could 
just as well be viewed as paying for the President’s lunch or national defense or 
healthcare or servicing official debt or for any other form of federal expenditure. 
If we measure Social Security’s infinite horizon fiscal gap, but omit FICA taxes 
on the grounds they are being used to pay for other things (and how can we prove 
otherwise?), the system’s fiscal gap is not $25 trillion, but $100 trillion! That’s 
more than five years of U.S. GDP!
Being $100 trillion in the red is a very long way from where we started with 
my saying the system is currently $2.8 trillion in the black. So what should we 
conclude? Is the system totally broke or is it swimming in cash?
John Mitchell, President Nixon’s Attorney General, had a pet phrase when it 
came to referencing number crunchers. “Figures lie and liars figure.” Mitchell, 
it turned out, was an expert with respect to lying. In fact, he went to jail for con-
spiracy, obstruction of justice, and perjury based on providing false testimony 
to Congress about the Watergate scandal. That’s quite a rap sheet for the coun-
try’s top judicial officer!
As I’ve shown, the first part of Mitchell’s phrase rings true when it comes to 
assessing Social Security’s solvency. Depending on which figure you use, you can 
Pension System Solvency – From Linguistics to Economics 85
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 2016, Vol. 152 (2)
1 See, for example, Kotlikoff (1986), Kotlikoff (1988), Kotlikoff (2002).
claim the system is in terrific or horrible fiscal shape. The second part of Mitch-
ell’s dictum on lying is also on target. American politicians on the left and the 
right are familiar with these different measures of Social Security’s (in)solvency. 
Consequently, they must realize that they are lying to or, at least, misleading the 
public when they claim to know for sure Social Security’s financial condition.
The reason there is no single correct measure of Social Security’s or any pen-
sion system’s solvency goes back to economics’ labeling problem, which Jerry Green 
and I described in formal terms in Green and Kotlikoff (2008).
What we showed in a fully general neoclassical framework, and which I have 
been demonstrating since 19861 in less general settings, is that conventional 
fiscal measures, be they government debt, the deficit, taxes, transfers payments, 
disposable income, personal saving, private saving, private wealth, government 
wealth, and capitalism in general (i.e., private ownership), are not well defined 
economic measures. Instead, they are, like time and distance in physics, mea-
surements of our frames of reference. In physics, that would be our direction 
and rate of speed through space. In economics, that would simply be our label-
ing conventions – the decisions governments make as to whether to call specific 
government receipts “borrowing” or “taxes” and the decisions they make as to 
whether to call particular government payments “return of principal plus inter-
est” or “transfer payments.” These arbitrary decisions, which would make the 
perpetrators of Enron’s accounting fraud blush, determine what gets put on and 
what is kept off the books.
As Green and Kotlikoff (2008) makes clear, there are an infinite number 
of internally consistent methods of labeling the same fiscal policy, each of which 
will produce its own past, current, and future paths of government debts, deficits, 
and all the other aforementioned fiscal “variables.” In short, conventional fiscal 
accounting, which occupies roughly 40 percent of the national income account-
ing chapters in most introductory economics textbooks, has nothing whatsoever 
to do with economics and everything to do with linguistics.
The Economists’ New Clothes
The fact that economists, as a group, are discussing fiscal policy based on eco-
nomically meaningless measures is beyond distressing. Here we are dedicated to 
conveying and developing economic science, yet we engage in analyses that are 
wholly inconsistent with basic economic theory.
86 Laurence J. Kotlikoff
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 2016, Vol. 152 (2)
Were we, as a profession, simply routinely engaged in innocent, if mindless 
consideration of meaningless measures, the only damage would be our loss of 
time and credibility. But having certified these measures as legitimate fiscal indi-
cators and having persuaded governments around the world, as well as the IMF, 
OECD, the World Bank, and other major international institutions, to use these 
numbers to assess nations’ fiscal conditions, we economists find ourselves playing 
the tailors in Hans Christian Anderson’s The Emperor’s New Clothes.
This, of course, is the story of a king’s tailors who are absolutely terrified by 
the truth that they have failed to produce any garments whatsoever for the king, 
let alone the most splendid garments in all the land. Rather than confess their 
failure, they persuade the king that he is dressed in the most magnificent attire 
when, in fact, he is naked.
And the king, who doesn’t want to sound stupid and say he doesn’t see or 
feel these new clothes, when he thinks others can, especially his brilliant tai-
lors, becomes “persuaded” that he’s actually dressed. This leads everyone in his 
court to become likewise “persuaded.” The king then proceeds to parade his new 
clothes to the public. A small boy in the crowd screams out, “But the King is 
Naked!” at which point there is a murmur in the crowd, the king stops, ponders 
this for a moment, and then continues his parade to even louder cheers.
How Economic Theory Says to Measure Fiscal Sustainability
Were measuring fiscal sustainability simple, we economists would, presumably, 
be less likely to be substituting accounting and linguistics for economics. But 
the presence of aggregate shocks and the incompleteness of markets that pre-
vent our pricing these aggregate shocks make assessing fiscal sustainability quite 
challenging.
Setting aside aggregate uncertainty, economics prescription for understand-
ing a country’s fiscal solvency is quite simple: Determine whether the economy’s 
current policy path satisfies the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. 
This leads naturally to fiscal gap and generational accounting. The fiscal gap is 
simply the present value difference between all projected government expendi-
tures and all projected receipts.
The all is important. It requires that everything be put on the books regard-
less of the government’s labeling convention. This obviously includes all pension 
system receipts and payments. But, I just told you that what is and is not a part of 
the pension system is entirely arbitrary! Yes, that’s true. But the beauty of fiscal 
gap accounting is that reclassifying any fiscal policy, including pensions, won’t 
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change the fiscal gap. The reason is simple – everything is put on the books no 
matter how it is labeled. The all in all expenditures and all receipts also and quite 
critically includes expenditures and receipts out to infinity. I.e., the fiscal gap is 
the infinite-horizon fiscal gap.
Now why would one need to consider receipts and expenditures through the 
end of time, notwithstanding the fact that they are being discounted to the pres-
ent? The reason is that any finite horizon fiscal gap, be it 50, 75, or 100 years is 
not well defined in the sense that with the proper labeling convention any finite 
horizon fiscal gap of any size, positive or negative, can be reported. It is only the 
fiscal gap measured over the infinite horizon that is label free!
The U.S. Fiscal Gap
How big is the fiscal gap? Well, in the case of the U.S. Social Security system it’s 
$25 trillion. But, as already argued, that number is also meaningless because what 
is and is not called a part of Social Security is simply a matter of word choice. 
But the overall U.S. fiscal gap, in which everything is put on the books, is mean-
ingful. And its size is a sad testimony of the degree to which economists, in per-
mitting politicians to substitute deficit for fiscal gap accounting, have facilitated 
what amounts to nothing less than generational theft.
The U.S. fiscal gap now stands at $210 trillion. This is 16 times the $13 tril-
lion in official debt held by the public. It’s also almost 12 years of GDP! On an 
ongoing basis the fiscal gap represents 10.5 percent of GDP. I.e., if you discount 
10.5 percent of annual projected GDP, you arrive at $210 trillion.
But where do the projections come from underlying the number. They come 
straight from the U.S. government, specifically the Congressional Budget 
Office’s July 2014 Alternative Fiscal Scenario. The CBO projects expenditures 
and receipts out 75 years. But it’s easy to extend these projections through the 
infinite horizon because the CBO projects constant ratios of expenditures and 
receipts to GDP far before the 75 years have elapsed. It also assumes a fixed 
GDP growth rate in the run up to year 2090. I used a 3 percent real discount 
rate, which is very close to what the Social Security Trustees use in their fiscal 
gap calculations.
88 Laurence J. Kotlikoff
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 2016, Vol. 152 (2)
America’s Unfunded Liability
When Detroit declared bankruptcy last year, its two pension funds were under-
funded by 20 percent. In comparison, the entire U.S. fiscal operation is under-
funded by 58 percent. Stated differently, it would take a 58 percent higher time 
path of federal receipts to produce the extra $210 trillion needed, in present value, 
to close the U.S. fiscal gap. This means that every single federal tax rate would 
need to be raised by 58 percent or more (to account for tax evasion and avoid-
ance) in order to produce the required time path of extra receipts. And this needs 
to occur immediately and be maintained forever.
Another option is to cut all expenditures, including those labeled servicing of 
interest and principal on official debt, immediately and permanently by 33 per-
cent. This too sounds and is draconian, but it’s precisely what the CBO’s projec-
tions are telling us.
Delay Will Make the Requisite Adjustment Even Larger
Fiscal policy, generationally and intertemporally speaking, is a zero-sum game. 
The less current older generations pay in the form of higher taxes or lower transfer 
payments, the more today’s young generations as well as all future generations will 
be forced to pay either in the form of what’s labeled higher future taxes or what’s 
labeled lower future transfer payments. For example, if we make no adjustments to 
receipts or spending for the next two decades and decide at that point to raise taxes, 
the requisite immediate and permanent tax hike is not 58 percent, but 70 percent.
Implications for Generational Accounting
Generational accounting considers the burden on young and future generations 
of having to pay off the fiscal gap if the entire gap is left for them to pay. Clearly, 
letting all current adults off the hook would mean confronting today’s and tomor-
row’s children with lifetime net tax rates that are at least twice as large as those 
adult Americans have experienced in their days gone by. Doing so would not 
only be immoral by most people’s standards. It would also likely prove infeasible 
given the incredibly high net tax rates that would be needed on out kids to give 
today’s adults a total pass. When net tax rates get too high, people head for the 
hills, i.e., to different countries. This is particularly true of high-skilled workers 
who can easily sell their services to employers in foreign lands.
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Implications of the Fiscal Gap on the Economy’s  
Intertemporal Budget
When a country has a positive fiscal gap, let alone an enormous one like that 
of the U.S., it is pretending that its government can consume, in present value, 
more that it can pay for, in present value, in the form of taxes net of transfer pay-
ments. (Taxes, by the way, should be construed here to include seignorage arising 
from money creation). Now if one adds the government’s unbalanced intertem-
poral budget to appropriately discounted (discounted to the present using the 
time path of the economy’s marginal product path) intertemporal budget con-
straints of successive generations one arrives at an economy-wide intertemporal 
budget constraint with the following implication – the country is trying to spend 
more than its resources.
This, in essence, is America’s fiscal dilemma. The public and government 
are prospectively and collectively trying to consume more that the economy’s 
resources, i.e., the country’s net wealth plus the present value (as of today) of all 
its current and future human wealth. This attempt to consume far in excess of 
what our nation, and certainly our children, can afford is not a recent phenom-
enon. It’s been going on for over six decades under Republican and Democratic 
administrations alike.
The proof is provided by America’s postwar history of net national saving. The 
U.S. net national saving – net national saving divided by net national income (all 
measured at producer prices) was 15 percent in 1950. Today it is 3 percent. The 
six-decade-long downhill slide in the U.S. net national saving rate has not been 
perfectly steady, but it’s been persistent.
What has spurred this dramatic decline in U.S. national saving? The answer is 
a massive and sustained redistribution from the young to the old that occurred 
under many headings (labels) – tax cuts, increases in Social Security, Medicare, 
and Medicaid benefits, reductions in dividend and capital gains tax rates, as well 
as explicit federal borrowing.
But why should taking from the young and giving to the old, whether under 
one guise or another, cause the nation to consume more and save less? The answer 
is that these “take-as-you-go” policies are not redistributing from one large happy 
intergenerationally-connected/altruistically-linked family that shares resources 
no matter their ownership.
On the country, the evidence against intergenerational altruism, discussed in 
my book, Generational Policy, appears overwhelming. When it comes to con-
sumption, the young and the old, even within an extended family, act as if they 
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are strangers. Moreover, since the elderly have fewer years left to live, their pro-
pensities to spend are much higher than those of the young. Hence, using fiscal 
policy to take from young and future savers and give to old spenders produces 
more overall consumption and lower national saving – precisely as predicted by 
the selfish life-cycle model in which each generation is out for its own.
To drive this point home, consider the 12 percentage-point rise in consump-
tion as a share of net national income since 1950. Some 11 of the 12 percentage 
points can be traced to a higher rate of consumption of households. I.e., house-
hold consumption as a share of national income is now 11 percentage points 
larger than it was in 1950.
And this dramatic increase in the nation’s rate of household consumption has 
occurred primarily among the elderly. In 1960, the earliest postwar year for which 
data are available, the U.S. age-consumption profile was hump shaped. Today, 
as the work of Berkeley economist and demographer, Ronald Lee, confirms, it’s 
a straight upward sloping curve.2 One striking summary of what’s happened is 
provided by the ratio of the average consumption of a 80 year-old to that of a 
40 year old. This ratio was roughly 75 percent in 1960. By 2007, it was roughly 
140 percent!
As emphasized by Feldstein and Horioka (1980), U.S. net national saving 
and net domestic investment move together. Hence, the decline in U.S. net 
national saving has produced a decline in U.S. net domestic investment. In 1950 
U.S. net domestic investment was also 15 percent of net national income. Today 
it’s just 4 percent.
Fiscal Gaps in Other Countries
In 2012, the European Council prepared what it calls S2 indicators of the infi-
nite horizon fiscal gap of 17 EU countries (European Commission, 2012).The 
findings are remarkable. Italy has a fiscal gap equal to negative 2.3 percent of 
the present value of GDP. Luxembourg has a fiscal gap of close to 10 percent 
of the present value of GDP. The U.S., recall, faces a fiscal gap of 10.5 percent 
of the present value of GDP. Germany and France have relatively modest fiscal 
gaps – around 2 percent, whereas the UK has a pretty sizeable one, over 5 percent.
The bottom line is that the correlation between official debt to GDP ratios 
and fiscal gap to the present value of GDP ratios appears to be small or negative. 
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This is not surprising. The countries in the worst long-term fiscal shape have the 
greatest incentive to keep most of their fiscal obligations off the books.
Italy, or course, is viewed by the bond market as in far worse fiscal shape than 
the U.S. or Luxembourg. This is a sad statement about the inability of those trad-
ing Italian, U.S., and Luxembourg government bonds to act independent of the 
actions of other traders. As Keynes pointed out, traders can survive if they lose 
money in a pack. But if they lose money on their own, their gooses are cooked, 
potentially for good. So their main concern, when it comes to placing trades, is 
not economic or fiscal reality, but the perceptions of other traders about those 
realities. If they think that other traders are pricing Italian bonds too low, but 
aren’t likely to start buying, they won’t buy either until they get a signal that col-
lective “wisdom” has changed. This, partly, is why financial markets experience 
such large and abrupt swings. These markets, like other sectors of the economy, 
are subject to quite nasty faith-based multiple equilibria.
Assessing Fiscal Sustainability in Light of Aggregate Uncertainty
The fiscal gap must, in the end, be zero. I.e., along any realized path of the econ-
omy, the economy can’t consume more than its resources.3 Hence, the fiscal gap, 
in the manner that I, Auerbach and Gale (2014), Gokhale (2014), Raffel-
heuschen (2014), and many others have been calculating, represents a coun-
terfactual exercise, which assumes the indefinite maintenance of current policy. 
In the context of uncertainty, one can run this counterfactual for all potential 
paths of the economy and weight each path by its probability. The result will be 
an expected present value fiscal gap. Although no one has, to my knowledge, 
produced such a measure, it seem eminently feasible.
Other Means of Assessing Fiscal Sustainability
A different approach to determining if a fiscal policy is feasible is to simulate 
fiscal policy in a detailed life-cycle computational general equilibrium model. 
An example here is Benzel et al. (2015). This study examines the interconnected 
demographic, fiscal, and macroeconomic transitions of the U.S., China, the EU, 
India, Russia, and Japan plus Korea.
92 Laurence J. Kotlikoff
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 2016, Vol. 152 (2)
As the paper points out, several of these countries/regions are skating very 
close to the edge when it comes to the maintenance of their current fiscal affairs. 
Indeed, if one pushes this model much farther with respect to running genera-
tional policies that are adverse to young and future generations the model pro-
vides a strong statement about sustainability. Specifically, the model refuses to 
converge. This is due not to any problem in the model’s convergence algorithm, 
but due to the model’s inability to permit the global economy or any region/coun-
try therein to consume more than it now owns and can produce going forward.
The Holy Grail -- Assessing Overall Fiscal Sustainability via Monte 
Carlo Simulations
The first-best method for understanding whether a country’s fiscal policy is sus-
tainable is to posit the precise means and timing of fiscal adjustment that the 
country will ultimately utilize. Given this, one can construct a dynamic, gen-
eral equilibrium life-cycle model with aggregate shocks and simulate the distri-
bution of the economy’s position through time. Policies that leave future genera-
tions, in most simulated future states of nature, in dire economic circumstances 
may potentially be viewed as sustainable, but as also highly undesirable. If illu-
minating what current policy will likely mean for our progeny suffices to alter 
the nature or duration of current policy, economists will have earned their keep.
All this is far more easily said than done. The well known and dreaded Curse of 
Dimensionality has, to date, restricted our ability to simulate highly detailed ver-
sions of the life-cycle model with heterogeneous life-cycle agents in the presence 
of macro shocks. But new techniques are being developed over time, some more 
robust than others. The list here includes Marcet (1988), Rios-Rull (1996), 
Krussel and Smith (1998), Kreuger and Kluber (2006), Judd, Maliar, and 
Maliar (2011), and Hasanhodzic and Kotlikoff (2013). My sense is that 
within a decade we will be in a position to simulate the kinds of models needed 
to better assess fiscal sustainability. In the meantime, however, the evidence pre-
sented in Hasanhodzic and Kotlikoff (2013) suggests that the inclusion of 
macro shocks may prove of relatively minor importance in simulating fiscal policy 
paths. While macro shocks can provide variability along the transition path, this 
variability appears to be quite small compared to the impact of the policy itself. 
Stated differently, it’s highly unlikely that one can hope for, let alone rely on 
positive macroeconomic shocks to bail out a country that is running what, apart 
from such shocks, is a highly unaffordable fiscal policy.
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Conclusion
Neither economic theory nor common sense support piecemeal analysis of a 
country’s fiscal circumstances, including that of its pension systems. Any and all 
fiscal analyses that hope to tell us anything whatsoever about a country’s fiscal 
condition need to be comprehensive and account for the present, near term, and 
far term. Any approach short of this represents an exercise in linguistics not eco-
nomic science. Unfortunately, the analysis of senseless fiscal indictors is rampant 
in our real, actually, unreal world.
This leaves we economists with three difficult tasks. First, we need to admit 
that we have spent decades conspiring with politicians to substitute fiscal non-
sense for fiscal truth to help them win reelection and to keep ourselves in their 
good graces. Second, we need to identify and expose those nations, like the 
United States, that are waging economic war on their children by leaving them 
fiscal liabilities that are far beyond their capacities to pay. Third, we need to 
make plain that countries that try to spend more than they can afford not only 
impoverish their children directly, but also indirectly by leaving them with far 
less capital to work than would otherwise be the case. In short, when it comes 
to assessing fiscal policy, economists need to stick with their science, not with 
what politicians want to hear.
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Appendix: Tables from the 2014 Social Security Trustees Report
Table II.B1: Summary of 2013 Trust Fund Financial Operations (in Billion $)
OASI DI OASDI
Asset reserves at the end of 2012 2,609.7 122.7 2,732.3
Total income in 2013 743.8 111.2 855.0
Net payroll tax contributions 
Reimbursement from General Fund of the Treasury 














Total expenditures in 2013 679.5 143.4 822.9
Benefit payments 











Net increase in asset reserves in 2013 64.3 –32.2 32.1
Asset reserves at the end of 2013 2,674.0 90.4 2,764.4
Note: Totals do not necessarily equal the sums of rounded components.
Source: U. S. Social Security Administration (2014).
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Table IV.B1: Annual Income Rates, Cost Rates, and Balances, 


















1990 11.47 9.66 1.82 1.18 1.09 0.10 12.66 10.74 1.91
1995 10.64 10.22 .42 1.87 1.44 .43 12.51 11.67 .85
2000 10.84 8.98 1.87 1.78 1.42 .36 12.62 10.40 2.23
2001 10.90 9.08 1.82 1.82 1.48 .35 12.72 10.55 2.17
2002 11.06 9.29 1.76 1.85 1.60 .24 12.90 10.89 2.01
2003 10.79 9.35 1.44 1.80 1.68 .12 12.59 11.03 1.56
2004 10.73 9.27 1.46 1.79 1.78 .02 12.53 11.05 1.48
2005 10.96 9.31 1.65 1.84 1.85 –.02 12.80 11.16 1.63
2006 10.96 9.18 1.78 1.83 1.88 –.05 12.79 11.06 1.73
2007 11.01 9.44 1.57 1.84 1.88 –.04 12.85 11.32 1.53
2008 10.90 9.54 1.37 1.83 2.01 –.19 12.73 11.55 1.18
2009 11.23 10.74 .50 1.88 2.31 –.43 13.11 13.05 .06
2010 10.75 11.06 –.30 1.79 2.41 –.62 12.54 13.47 –.92
2011 10.84 11.04 –.21 1.80 2.42 –.62 12.64 13.47 –.83
2012 11.04 11.34 –.30 1.81 2.46 –.66 12.84 13.80 –.96
2013 10.96 11.53 –.57 1.81 2.43 –.63 12.77 13.97 –1.20
Intermediate:
2014 10.87 11.58 –.71 1.80 2.37 –.58 12.67 13.95 –1.29
2015 11.09 11.65 –.56 1.83 2.32 –.49 12.92 13.97 –1.05
2016 11.07 11.71 –.64 1.83 2.26 –.43 12.89 13.97 –1.08
2017 11.08 11.77 –.69 1.83 2.20 –.38 12.91 13.97 –1.06
2018 11.10 11.86 –.76 1.83 2.15 –.33 12.93 14.02 –1.08
2019 11.12 12.03 –.91 1.83 2.12 –.29 12.95 14.15 –1.20
2020 11.13 12.23 –1.10 1.83 2.10 –.27 12.96 14.33 –1.37
2021 11.15 12.41 –1.26 1.83 2.09 –.26 12.98 14.50 –1.52
2022 11.18 12.64 –1.46 1.83 2.10 –.26 13.01 14.74 –1.73
2023 11.20 12.90 –1.71 1.83 2.10 –.27 13.03 15.00 –1.97
2025 11.23 13.42 –2.19 1.84 2.12 –.28 13.07 15.54 –2.47
2030 11.31 14.52 –3.21 1.84 2.09 –.25 13.15 16.60 –3.46
2035 11.34 15.01 –3.66 1.84 2.08 –.24 13.19 17.09 –3.90
2040 11.35 15.00 –3.64 1.84 2.09 –.24 13.20 17.09 –3.89
2045 11.35 14.78 –3.43 1.85 2.16 –.31 13.20 16.94 –3.74
2050 11.35 14.69 –3.34 1.85 2.20 –.35 13.20 16.89 –3.69
2055 11.36 14.78 –3.42 1.85 2.24 –.38 13.21 17.01 –3.80
2060 11.38 15.03 –3.65 1.85 2.23 –.37 13.23 17.26 –4.03
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2065 11.39 15.26 –3.86 1.85 2.24 –.39 13.25 17.50 –4.25
2070 11.41 15.49 –4.09 1.85 2.25 –.39 13.26 17.74 –4.48
2075 11.42 15.65 –4.23 1.85 2.24 –.38 13.27 17.88 –4.61
2080 11.42 15.63 –4.21 1.86 2.27 –.42 13.27 17.90 –4.63
2085 11.42 15.73 –4.31 1.86 2.31 –.45 13.28 18.04 –4.76
2090 11.44 15.99 –4.55 1.86 2.30 –.45 13.30 18.29 –5.00
First year balance becomes 
negative and remains negative 




2014 10.81 11.43 –.61 1.79 2.31 –.52 12.60 13.74 –1.14
2015 11.11 11.28 –.16 1.84 2.19 –.35 12.95 13.46 –.52
2016 11.03 11.17 –.14 1.82 2.08 –.25 12.86 13.25 –.39
2017 11.05 11.12 –.08 1.82 1.98 –.16 12.87 13.10 –.23
2018 11.06 11.15 –.08 1.82 1.90 –.08 12.89 13.05 –.16
2019 11.07 11.22 –.15 1.82 1.84 –.02 12.89 13.06 –.16
2020 11.08 11.32 –.24 1.82 1.79 .03 12.90 13.11 –.21
2021 11.10 11.41 –.31 1.82 1.76 .06 12.92 13.17 –.25
2022 11.12 11.52 –.41 1.82 1.73 .09 12.94 13.26 –.32
2023 11.13 11.66 –.53 1.82 1.71 .12 12.96 13.37 –.42
2025 11.16 11.99 –0.83 1.83 1.68 0.14 12.99 13.67 –0.69
2030 11.21 12.62 –1.41 1.83 1.58 .25 13.04 14.20 –1.16
2035 11.23 12.76 –1.53 1.83 1.52 .31 13.06 14.28 –1.22
2040 11.22 12.50 –1.28 1.83 1.49 .34 13.06 13.99 –.94
2045 11.21 12.13 –.92 1.83 1.51 .32 13.04 13.65 –.60
2050 11.20 11.91 –.70 1.83 1.52 .31 13.04 13.43 –.39
2055 11.20 11.84 –.64 1.83 1.52 .31 13.04 13.37 –.33
2060 11.21 11.89 –.68 1.83 1.50 .34 13.04 13.38 –.34
2065 11.21 11.86 –.66 1.83 1.49 .35 13.04 13.35 –.31
2070 11.20 11.81 –.60 1.83 1.48 .36 13.04 13.29 –.25
2075 11.20 11.65 –.46 1.83 1.47 .37 13.03 13.12 –.09
2080 11.18 11.37 –.19 1.83 1.49 .34 13.02 12.86 .15
2085 11.18 11.26 –.08 1.84 1.52 .31 13.01 12.78 .23
2090 11.18 11.34 –.16 1.84 1.52 .31 13.02 12.86 .15
First year balance becomes 
negative and remains negative 
throughout the projection 
period 
2010 b b
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2014 10.94 11.79 –.84 1.81 2.45 –.64 12.75 14.24 –1.48
2015 11.05 12.12 –1.07 1.82 2.48 –.65 12.88 14.60 –1.72
2016 11.10 12.38 –1.28 1.83 2.48 –.65 12.93 14.87 –1.93
2017 11.13 12.59 –1.47 1.83 2.48 –.65 12.96 15.07 –2.11
2018 11.16 12.83 –1.67 1.83 2.47 –.64 12.99 15.30 –2.31
2019 11.17 13.12 –1.95 1.83 2.47 –.64 13.01 15.59 –2.58
2020 11.19 13.43 –2.24 1.84 2.48 –.64 13.03 15.91 –2.88
2021 11.22 13.69 –2.47 1.84 2.50 –.67 13.06 16.19 –3.13
2022 11.25 13.98 –2.74 1.84 2.53 –.69 13.09 16.51 –3.42
2023 11.27 14.35 –3.07 1.84 2.56 –.71 13.12 16.90 –3.79
2025 11.32 15.07 –3.75 1.85 2.63 –.78 13.17 17.70 –4.54
2030 11.42 16.72 –5.30 1.85 2.69 –.84 13.27 19.41 –6.15
2035 11.48 17.70 –6.22 1.86 2.76 –.91 13.33 20.46 –7.13
2040 11.51 18.09 –6.58 1.86 2.82 –.96 13.37 20.91 –7.54
2045 11.52 18.19 –6.67 1.86 2.96 –1.10 13.39 21.15 –7.76
2050 11.54 18.39 –6.85 1.87 3.06 –1.19 13.41 21.45 –8.04
2055 11.57 18.79 –7.22 1.87 3.16 –1.29 13.44 21.95 –8.50
2060 11.61 19.42 –7.81 1.88 3.19 –1.32 13.48 22.61 –9.13
2065 11.65 20.09 –8.45 1.88 3.25 –1.38 13.53 23.35 –9.82
2070 11.69 20.87 –9.18 1.88 3.29 –1.41 13.57 24.16 –10.59
2075 11.74 21.63 –9.89 1.88 3.29 –1.41 13.62 24.92 –11.30
2080 11.77 22.20 –10.43 1.88 3.34 –1.45 13.65 25.54 –11.88
2085 11.81 22.83 –11.02 1.88 3.36 –1.48 13.69 26.19 –12.50
2090 11.85 23.50 –11.65 1.88 3.33 –1.45 13.73 26.83 –13.10
First year balance becomes 
negative and remains negative 
throughout the projection 
period
2010 2005 2010
a Income rates include certain reimbursements from the General Fund of the Treasury.
b The Trustees project the annual balance to be negative for a temporary period and return to 
positive levels before the end of the projection period.
Notes: 1. The income rate excludes interest income.
2. Revisions of taxable payroll may change some historical values.
3. Totals do not necessarily equal the sums of rounded components.
Source: U. S. Social Security Administration (2014).
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Table VI.F1: Unfunded OASDI Obligations Through the Infinite Horizon,  
Based on Intermediate Assumptions
(Present Values as of January 1, 2014; Dollar Amounts in Trillions)
Present value Expressed as a percentage 




Unfunded obligation through the infinite horizona $24.9 4.1 1.4
Unfunded obligation through 2088b 10.6 2.7 1.0
a Present value of future cost less future non-interest income, reduced by the amount of trust 
fund asset reserves at the beginning of 2014. Expressed as a percentage of payroll and GDP 
for the period 2014 through the infinite horizon.
b Present value of future cost less future non-interest income through 2088, reduced by the 
amount of trust fund reserves at the beginning of 2014. Expressed as a percentage of payroll 
and GDP for the period 2014 through 2088.
Notes: 1. The present values of future taxable payroll for 2014–88 and for 2014 through the infi-
nite horizon are $386.9 trillion and $603.3 trillion, respectively.
2. The present values of GDP for 2014–88 and for 2014 through the infinite horizon are $1,093.7 
trillion and $1,816.7 trillion, respectively. Present values of GDP shown in the Medicare Trustees 
Report differ slightly due to the use of interest discount rates that are specific to each program’s 
trust fund holdings.
Source: U. S. Social Security Administration (2014).
